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1ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? 1. Some princes, so as to
2hold securely the state, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;
3others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they
4distrusted in the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and destroyed them.
5And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those
6states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will
7admit. 2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed he has
8always armed them, because, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become faithful, and
9those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed,
10yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their
11treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering it to be necessary
12that those who have the most danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you
13at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these
14opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries,
15which are of the character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against
16powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always
17distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to
18his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring
19it; and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should be managed in
20such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you. 3.
21Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by
22factions and Pisa by fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to
23keep possession of them the more easily. This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced,
24but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be
25of use; rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the
26weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I
27believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although they
28never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted
29by their differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because,
30after the rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in
31the prince, because these factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the
32more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious. 4.
33Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and
34therefore fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater necessity to earn renown
35than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity
36of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many
37consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against himself, so
38that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher. 5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and
39assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were
40trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others. But
41on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say this, that those
42men who at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support
43themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with
44fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had
45formed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much
46security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of
47secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who
48did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then he will only
49keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the
50reasons for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier
51for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under the former government, and are therefore his
52enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.
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