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1CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE Those who solely by
2good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they
3have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those
4to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in Greece, in
5the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities
6both for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being
7citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two
8most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they
9are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always
10lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and
11faithful. States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are born and grow rapidly, cannot
12leave their foundations and correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them;
13unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be
14prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have
15laid before they became princes, they must lay afterwards. [1] "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e.
16foundations) and correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning of "correspondence" and
17"correspondency" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by
18ability or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are Francesco Sforza[2] and
19Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be Duke of Milan,
20and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia,
21called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost
22it, notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix
23firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him. [2] Francesco Sforza, born
241401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose
25death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to
26Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at
27Sinigalia, and along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years before The
28Prince, of the proceedings of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo
29Vitelli," etc., a translation of which is appended to the present work. Because, as is stated above, he who has not
30first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to
31the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen
32that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do
33not know what better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions were of no
34avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. Alexander the Sixth, in wishing
35to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to
36make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that
37the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under the protection of
38the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands
39that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved
40him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of
41their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring
42back the French into Italy; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving the former
43marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of
44Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded
45to him on the reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while
46wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to
47him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using,
48would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had
49won, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and attacking
50Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after
51taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided
52to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties
53in Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay,
54and, according to their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment
55to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini,
56having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini,
57perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a meeting of the
58Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the
59duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by
60trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal
61his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention,
62giving him money, apparel, and horses--the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power
63at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, the duke laid
64sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning
65to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be
66imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out. [3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.
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