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1CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his
2country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a
3civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say
4then that such a principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in
5all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor
6oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there
7arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy. A principality is created
8either by the people or by the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles, seeing
9they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so
10that under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry
11up the reputation of one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains
12sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of
13the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of
14this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself
15alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and
16without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than
17that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added
18also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of there being too many, whilst from the
19nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to
20be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against
21him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to
22obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same
23people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away
24authority when it pleases him. Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly
25in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or
26they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind
27themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage,
28in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity
29you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding
30themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard
31against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.
32Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily
33do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince by the
34favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if
35he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are
36bound more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised to
37the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to
38the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the
39people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of
40all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and for the
41overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have
42been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that
43"He who builds on the people, builds on the mud," for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and
44persuades himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he
45would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in Florence.
46But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in
47adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people
48encouraged--such a one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations
49well. [1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C. [2] Messer
50Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli's "Florentine History," Book III. These principalities are
51liable to danger when they are passing from the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule
52personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests
53entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in troubled times, can
54destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid
55tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from
56magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity
57of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of
58the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die
59for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is
60this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course
61that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will
62always find them faithful.
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