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1THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I
2have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must
3consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible; and as
4often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.
5It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of
6his subjects, from both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their honor is touched, the
7majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many
8ways. It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of
9which a prince should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, courage,
10gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable,
11and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him. That prince is
12highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against;
13for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with
14difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other
15from without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,
16and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are quiet
17without, unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if
18he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist every
19attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has only to
20fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and
21despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to accomplish, as I said
22above at length. And one of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated
23and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when
24the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the
25difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few
26have been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he
27believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material
28with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this
29course to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a
30thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you. And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say
31that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him; but on
32the side of the prince there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to
33defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as
34to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has
35also to fear the sequel to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for
36any escape. Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with one, brought to pass within the
37memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale),
38having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer
39Giovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi.
40This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great
41that, although none remained there after the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having
42information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of
43a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer
44Giovanni came in due course to the government. [1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He
45ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli's strong condemnation of conspiracies may get its edge from his own very
46recent experience (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli
47conspiracy. For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold
48him in esteem; but when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and everybody.
49And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the
50people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have. Among the best ordered
51and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and
52security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its authority, because he who founded the kingdom,
53knowing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths would be necessary to
54hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished
55to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the
56reproach which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for favouring the
57nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to
58the king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king and
59kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the
60management of others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish
61the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people. It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the
62lives and deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of
63them lived nobly and showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by
64subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters
65of some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the
66same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those
67times. It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the philosopher down
68to Maximinus; they were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla,
69Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
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